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JUDICIAL PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS: FEAR THE IRISH WOMEN!
Albert J. Klumpp*
INTRODUCTION
The question of how to select judges for our state courts has pro-
duced one of the longest-running public policy debates in our nation's
history. Opinions abound on the relative merits of elective and ap-
pointive selection systems, and the diversity of opinion has only in-
creased over the years as different states have implemented new
varieties of elective, appointive, and hybrid systems. Surprisingly
lacking in this debate, though, has been supporting evidence-that is,
empirical research on the different systems that would help evaluate
their relative performance. What actually determines which judicial
candidates reach the bench and which do not? Far too little attention
has been paid to this fundamental question.
At the supreme court level the problem is not quite as severe today
as it once was. Recent years have seen improvement in the quantity
and quality of research on state supreme court selection. In part, this
improvement has been driven by concern over the substantial increase
in campaign contributions and campaign spending in recent state su-
preme court elections. The lower courts, however, remain overlooked
and under-researched, even though lower-court candidates in elective
states conduct campaigns of their own and even though most of the
work of our state court systems is done by the lower courts.
Part of this problem stems from a failure by policymakers and the
legal community to seek out or demand proper research. Proponents
of the various selection systems have been overly content to simply
argue back and forth without offering, or even seeking, hard evidence
to support their arguments. Another part of the problem is a lack of
interest within the academic community. The amount of academic re-
search produced on state judicial selection has been a mere fraction of
* Ph.D., Research Analyst, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Chicago, Illinois. Thanks to Mat
Delort, Richard Means, and the many other individuals who provided historical information on
slating and endorsements of candidates; and to Andy Nauman, Monique Franklin, and the Chi-
cago office staff of the Illinois State Board of Elections for assistance with campaign disclosure
records.
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the amount produced on state legislative or executive selection, or for
that matter on many other aspects of the judicial system.
Still another problem is a lack of consistent or well-developed
methodology, especially for elective systems. In many elective juris-
dictions there are large and potentially rich data sets of judicial con-
tests that could be assembled and analyzed to gain valuable insight
into how judicial elections function. The major impediment to doing
so is that the determinative election phase in most of these jurisdic-
tions is a partisan or nonpartisan primary. Many different variables
can affect the outcomes of primary contests, and attempting to evalu-
ate multiple variables across large groups of contests with varying
numbers of candidates raises significant methodological obstacles.
This Article addresses the methodology problem. It presents a pro-
cedure for analyzing large groups of judicial primary contests and ap-
plies that procedure to a data set containing more than 300 contests in
Cook County, Illinois, a large urban jurisdiction.
II. THE SETTING
Cook County, Illinois, is home to one of the nation's largest court
systems. The county, which includes the city of Chicago, chooses its
new judges through partisan elections as dictated by the Illinois con-
stitution. With hundreds of courtrooms to fill, the county's voters face
a substantial judicial ballot at every election. Between 1980 and 2010,
a total of 477 judicial vacancies were put before the electorate, to be
filled through the two-step process of party primary followed by gen-
eral election. Of the 477 vacancies, 435 were for circuit court judge-
ships, 36 were for the state appellate court, and 6 were for the state
supreme court (see Table 1 for data).
Some circuit court judgeships in Cook County are filled by county-
wide election; the rest are distributed among fifteen judicial subcir-
cuits into which the county is divided. The subcircuit system debuted
in 1992 and replaced the earlier system of designating Chicago-only
and suburbs-only judgeships. As for the higher courts, the county
elects eighteen judges for its own appellate courts and three of the
seven justices of the state supreme court. All of these judges, once
elected, are exempt from primaries or partisan contests if they wish to
remain on the bench. Instead, they stand for periodic yes/no retention
elections countywide and must earn 60% voter approval.
Table 1 below reports the number of Cook County vacancies in
each election year between 1980 and 2010, along with the number of
candidates seeking to fill those vacancies. As the table indicates, the
county is strongly Democratic. Fewer than one in six of the vacancies
[Vol. 60:821822
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TABLE 1. COMPETITION FOR COOK COUNTY JUDICIAL
1980-2010
Contested
Democratic Republican Democratic
Vacancies Candidates Candidates Primaries
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
30
12
25
21
29
19
59
61
54
25
21
27
18
23
29
24
38
19
37
90
74
90
194
225
180
142
78
94
73
67
93
102
13
7
19
12
18
22
54
41
30
36
6
19
13
15
13
2
4
6
9
13
24
18
46
46
39
22
17
21
16
15
25
21
VACANCIES,
Contested
Republican
Primaries
2
1
2
4
2
3
12
12
8
9
2
3
4
5
5
1
TOTAL 477 1596 320 342 75
Supreme 6 27 6 5 2
Court
Appellate 36 136 23 30 4
Court
Circuit 435 1433 291 307 69
Court
Note: Circuit court figures include countywide, city-only (1980-1992), suburbs-only
(1980-1992), and subcircuit (1992-2010) contests.
produced a Republican primary contest with two or more candidates.
Most of the Republican contests were in four suburban subcircuits
where Republican voters are a majority or a near-majority.
Among the primary, general, and retention elections, how impor-
tant is the primary? A review of past election results makes clear the
importance of winning a primary contest. In the general elections, a
competitive two-party contest is exceedingly rare. As shown in Table
2, most of the vacancies were simply conceded to one party or the
other, and fewer than one in twenty vacancies produced a two-party
contest competitive to within even ten percentage points. With few
exceptions, the general election is a foregone conclusion.
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TABLE 2. RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR COOK COUNTY
JUDICIAL VACANCIES, 1980-2010
Vote for Democratic Candidate Count Pct
100% (unopposed Democrat) 284 59.7%
65%-99% 60 12.6%
60%-64% 48 10.1%
55%-59% 20 4.2%
50%-54% 10 2.1%
45%-49% 13 2.7%
40%-44% 11 2.3%
35%-39% 10 2.1%
1%-35% 2 0.4%
0% (unopposed Republican) 18 3.8%
TOTAL 476 100.0%
Note: One newly created vacancy in 1990 was nullified
after the primary election.
TABLE 3. RESULTS OF RETENTION ELECTIONS FOR INCUMBENT
COOK COUNTY JUDGES, 1980-2010
CApproval Rate
80% and above
75%-79%
70%-74%
65%-69%
60%-64%
below 60%
TOTAL
ount Pct
118 13.6%
456 52.5%
218 25.1%
44 5.1%
20 2.3%
12 1.4%
868 100.0%
The same is true of the retention election. Table 3 shows that nearly
all of the 868 incumbent judges who have sought retention since 1980
have won it and won it easily. Less than 2% were defeated, and more
than 90% were retained by a comfortable margin of 70% or higher.
In short, the primary election is all but decisive. Candidates who
seek to become judges and remain judges are well positioned to do so
if they can emerge victorious from one primary contest. But how is
that victory attained?
Four categories of variables will be evaluated in this study; each has
long been believed to be influential in Cook County judicial primaries.
[Vol. 60:821824
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The first category is party endorsements. The Cook County Demo-
cratic Party slates candidates for all of the countywide judicial vacan-
cies. While slating is not the slam-dunk guarantee of victory that it
was in decades past, it still is viewed as a valuable electoral advantage
and is a prize aggressively sought by judicial candidates.' Slating also
occurs in most subcircuit contests, but practices vary widely. Some
subcircuits contain unified slating committees; in others, multiple local
organizations and politically influential individuals endorse candidates
on their own.
The second category consists of recommendations from newspapers
and bar associations. Four sources of recommendations on judicial
candidates have been demonstrated by previous research to have
measurable impacts on judicial voting in Cook County.2 The county's
two most prominent bar associations, the Chicago Bar Association
and the Chicago Council of Lawyers, issue qualification ratings for all
judicial primary candidates. The Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago
Tribune, the county's two major newspapers, do not rate every candi-
date but instead endorse a single candidate in every contest.
The third category consists of ballot cues-specifically, three ballot
cues that have attained legendary status in Cook County: gender, Irish
ethnicity, and first ballot position. Female candidates are believed to
hold a significant advantage over male candidates, a belief borne out
by election results over much of the past twenty years.3 The advan-
tage of an Irish-sounding name in Cook County has long been ac-
cepted as gospel truth, so much so that several past judicial candidates
with non-Irish names have legally changed their names to suggest
Irish ancestry.4
1. See, e.g., Abdon M. Pallasch, 'If We Slate You, Brother, You're in,' CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept.
17, 2007, at 14; Abdon M. Pallasch, Judgment Day, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at 14A;
Abdon M. Pallasch, The Nature of 'The Beast': Time Is Changing How Cook County Dems Slate
Judicial Candidates, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, at 20A.
2. See Albert J. Klumpp, The 2007 Judicial Elections-Partisanship, Campaign Spending, &
Voter Turnout, 21 CBA REC. 34, 35 (2007); Albert J. Klumpp, Judicial Retention Elections in
Cook County: Exercise of Democracy, or Exercise in Futility? (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with author) [hereinafter Klumpp, Retention
Elections].
3. See, e.g., Andrew Fegelman, Judicial Races a Boon for Women, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1992, at
B6; Steve Johnson, Force That Lifted Braun Carries a Wave of Women to Victory, Cm. TRIB.,
Mar. 19, 1992, at Al; Abdon M. Pallasch, Woman's Place Is on Bench, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Mar. 25,
2002, at 4.
4. See, e.g., Adrienne Drell, Irish Candidates' Luck Holds in Judicial Voting, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1998, at 28; Jim Ritter, Bill Targets Changing Name to Get Elected, CHI. SUN-TIMEs,
Oct. 24, 2005, at 5; Joseph R. Tybor & Maurice Possley, Judicial Candidates Cash in on Names,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1988, at B4; James Warren, Judge Hopefuls Bet on Luck of the Irish, Cm.
TRIB., Jan. 29, 1986, at B.
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As for ballot position, while not yet a settled question, several re-
cent studies have provided persuasive evidence that the candidate
listed first on the ballot gains a small but undeniable advantage over
his or her opponents.5 More relevantly, though, judicial candidates
and other candidates in Cook County have long believed the first po-
sition to be advantageous. Every election cycle sees hundreds of can-
didates lining up outside of state and county elections offices on the
first day of the candidacy filing period in order to be eligible for the
lottery drawing for the first ballot position in their contests.6
The final category is campaign spending. Table 4 summarizes the
campaign expenditures of candidates in contested primaries since
1980. While the figures do not approach the formidable amounts seen
in recent supreme court contests in other jurisdictions,'7 they certainly
indicate that candidates are willing to raise and spend significant sums
in the belief that campaign spending will pay dividends at the polls.
The question here is whether or not those dividends actually
materialize.
III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Only a few previous studies have attempted to quantitatively ana-
lyze large groups of partisan or nonpartisan judicial primaries.8 Each
study provided valuable information and made a useful contribution
to the field, but none produced a methodologically correct statistical
analysis from which valid conclusions could be drawn. Understanding
the limitations in past studies and what must be done to avoid them
requires a brief explanation of the specific obstacles involved.
On its surface, a data set of judicial contests appears temptingly
conventional. The vote percentage for each candidate seems the obvi-
ous outcome variable, and the electoral variables of the kinds de-
scribed above could easily be coded for every individual candidate
and tested as explanatory variables. A researcher analyzing such a
5. See, e.g., Amy King & Andrew Leigh, Are Ballot Order Effects Heterogeneous?, 90 Soc.
Sci. Q. 71 (2009); Jonathan GS Koppell & Jennifer A. Steen, The Effects of Ballot Position on
Election Outcomes, 66 J. POL. 267 (2004); Joanne M. Miller & Jon A. Krosnick, The Impact of
Candidate Name Order on Election Outcomes, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 291 (1998); Marc Meredith &
Yuval Salant, The Causes and Consequences of Ballot Order-Effects (Feb. 15, 2007) (paper
presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL),
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/pl98706_index.html.
6. See, e.g., R. Bruce Dold & Daniel Egler, Politicians by the Hundreds, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10,
1985, at BI; Shia Kapos, Top Ballot Spot Prize in Candidate Lottery, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25, 2001, at
B3; Ray Long, Candidates Line up for Next Run, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2003, at B3.
7. See generally James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009: Decade
of Change (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/dO9ldc9llbd67ff73bO9m6yvpgv.pdf.
8. See infra Part IV.
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TABLE 4. CAMPAIGN SPENDING BY COOK COUNTY JUDICIAL
PRIMARY CANDIDATES, 1980-2010
Nominal Dolluars
Candidates in
Vacancy Type Contested Races Total Spending ($) Median Spending ($)
Supreme 29 4,166,430.22 52,160.00
Appellate 138 4,981,436.11 15,824.07
Circuit 634 11,497,511.32 9,507.00
City (1980-1992) 95 1,062,875.77 8,286.71
Suburbs (1980-1992) 25 277,024.84 8,161.05
Subcircuit (1992-2010) 771 16,023,819.30 12,446.63
TOTAL 1692 38,009,097.56
Inflation-Adjusted (2010) Dollars
Candidates in
Vacancy Type Contested Races Total Spending ($) Median Spending ($)
Supreme 29 6,243,273.83 110,298.47
Appellate 138 6,329,186.42 24,181.03
Circuit 634 15,255,999.64 13,923.36
City (1980-1992) 95 1,966,896.19 15,389.60
Suburbs (1980-1992) 25 549,011.32 13,863.47
Subcircuit (1992-2010) 771 19,841,072.79 16,298.98
TOTAL 1692 50,185,440.19
data set might well be inclined to use a standard statistical procedure
such as ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression or one of its common
variations, treating each candidate as an independent unit of data.
Unfortunately, an analysis of this kind would be completely improper.
The problems begin with the fact that within each contest, the can-
didates compete against each other for the same votes. This means
that the vote total for a particular candidate is directly related to that
of his or her opponent(s). Conventional statistical procedures such as
OLS regression are based on an assumption of independence among
the units in the data set. Candidates in a judicial-contest data set are
not independent, so the assumption is violated.
A second problem is that the number of candidates per contest is
not fixed. It varies from one contest to another, which substantially
affects the vote distribution in each contest. With all else equal, the
electorate will disperse its votes more broadly as the number of candi-
dates in a contest increases. Consequently, candidates in different
contests cannot simply be amassed into a single data set and analyzed
as though they all competed under identical conditions. Since the
vote percentage for a candidate is substantially affected by contest
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
size, it cannot properly be used as the outcome variable. This is an-
other barrier to the use of standard statistical procedures.
A third, similar problem relates to the explanatory variables. The
impact of each variable on a candidate's vote percentage is influenced
not only by the characteristics of the candidate but also by those of his
or her opponents. For instance, if a certain segment of the electorate
votes specifically for female candidates, the advantage that a female
candidate stands to gain will depend on how many other females are
in her contest. If she is the only female, she will gain all of the pro-
female votes; if there are other females, she will gain only a portion;
and if all of the candidates are female, the advantage disappears com-
pletely. Accordingly, it would be incorrect to simply code each candi-
date as male or female and analyze the gender variable as though it
has the same impact in every contest. Gender and all of the other
explanatory variables must be formulated in relative terms and not
absolute terms.
IV. PREVIOUs RESEARCH
Four different approaches have been employed in previous mul-
tivariate statistical analyses of judicial contests. The earliest two stud-
ies on the topic used OLS regression to examine groups of contests in
Jefferson County, Kentucky and Dade County, Florida. 9 One study
used vote total as the outcome variable; the other used vote percent-
age. In both studies, the candidates were treated as independent units
and the explanatory variables were coded as absolutes.
Two other approaches appeared in subsequent studies. One study,
part of a broader report on Cook County judicial elections, classified
and analyzed candidates simply as winners or losers.10 Candidates
were treated as independent and explanatory variables were coded as
absolutes; moreover, the choice of a rigid win/lose outcome variable
deprived the analysis of most of the useful information present in the
election results. The other approach, in studies of supreme and appel-
late court elections, focuses on the performance of an incumbent can-
didate facing a single challenger." While mentioned here for the sake
9. Joel H. Goldstein, Bar Poll Ratings as the Leading Influence on a Non-Partisan Judicial
Election, 63 JUDICATURE 377 (1980); Mary L. Volcansek, An Exploration of the Judicial Election
Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572 (1981).
10. See Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, An Analysis of Judicial Elections in Cook County-
1988 Through 2000, in ELECTING JUDGES IN COOK COUNTY: THE ROLE OF MONEY, POLITICAL
PARTY, AND THE VOTERs 56, 63-64 (report by the Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice, 2003).
11. See Chris W. Bonneau, The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elec-
tions, 60 POL. RES. Q. 489 (2007); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality Mat-
ter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 AM. J. POL. ScI. 20 (2006); Melinda Gann
.[Vol. 60:821828
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of completeness, this approach is not relevant to the task at hand. Its
use is limited to contests between pairs of candidates from clearly de-
finable groups such as incumbent/challenger or Democrat/Republican.
The fourth approach, in a study of nonpartisan contests in Los An-
geles County, California, deserves particular attention because the
study correctly recognized and discussed the problems of interdepen-
dence of vote totals and explanatory variables within contests. 12 It
also used an analytical procedure that, except for correctable minor
faults, is intrinsically sound. The procedure is based on an
econometric model that was originally developed to study consumer
choice behavior and was later applied to a small data set of local
elections.13
Unfortunately, the consumer-choice approach is not the answer
here. This is because the econometric model is entirely multiplicative,
with simultaneous interactions among all of the explanatory variables
and no independent impacts. In other words, the model assumes that
voters possess complete information on every candidate and that they
simultaneously weigh all of it in their minds when casting their votes.
While this perfect-rationality scenario may be appropriate in some
consumer-choice contexts, in the case of low-information, low-visibil-
ity judicial contests it simply does not describe reality. Studies of judi-
cial voting have shown without exception that voters are very poorly
informed about judicial candidates,14 and no evidence has ever been
produced to support the notion that voters cognitively juggle multiple
variables in judicial contests or that interactions take place among
variables.
Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 315 (2001); Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Conditions for Competition
in Low-Information Judicial Elections: The Case of Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 62
POL. RES. Q. 523 (2009).
12. See Philip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate
Assessment, 18 LAw & Soc'y REv. 395 (1984).
13. Masao Nakanishi et al., Voting for a Political Candidate Under Conditions of Minimal
Information, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 36 (1974).
14. See, e.g., National Center for State Courts, Call to Action: Statement of the National Sum-
mit on Improving Judicial Selection 37-41 (unpublished report 2002), available at http:I/
www.ncsconline.org/d researchlCallToActionCommentary.pdf; see also Anthony Champagne,
Judicial Reform in Texas, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 93 (Anthony Champagne &
Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Voorhees E. Dunn, Jr., Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, in JUDICIAL
REFORM IN THE STATES, supra, at 117, 117-38; Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing
Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992); Charles A.
Johnson et al., The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 Soc. Sc. Q. 371 (1978); R.
Neal McKnight et al., Choosing Judges: Do Voters Know What They're Doing?, 62 JUDICATURE
94, 95 (1978).
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The bottom line is that there is no existing example of an analysis
that is methodologically sound, is applicable to contests with varying
numbers of candidates, and offers a realistic model of the voting pro-
cess. A new approach is needed.
V. DEFINING THE MODEL
The analytical model used in this study is based on three broad as-
sumptions. First, if there are no variables that convey a net electoral
advantage to any candidate in a contest, each candidate will receive an
equal share of the votes cast. Second, to the extent that a variable
conveys a net advantage in a contest, it will redistribute votes from the
disadvantaged candidate(s) to the advantaged candidate(s). Third,
the effect size of each variable is consistent across contests.
The first assumption is, of course, a fiction. There are winners and
losers in all judicial contests, and there are reasons why a candidate
wins or loses. The purpose of the assumption is not to describe reality
on its own, but to create a null hypothesis that can be applied to dif-
ferent contests with varying numbers of candidates. In a two-candi-
date contest, the null-hypothesis result would be 50% shares; with five
candidates, 20% shares; and with ten candidates, 10% shares.
The second assumption describes the impact of the explanatory
variables. A variable that influences voters will increase the vote for
some candidates and decrease the vote for others. In other words, the
impact is assumed to be redistributive.
These two assumptions make possible an outcome variable that will
be used in place of raw vote percentages. The variable is the amount
by which the candidates' vote percentages differ from their null-hy-
pothesis percentages. Its expected value will be zero for every candi-
date, and its actual value will be the net impact of all of the
explanatory variables that influence voters (plus random error). This
modified variable compensates for variation in contest size. Techni-
cally the variable is truncated, with a lower bound of -50 (two candi-
dates, each with a null-hypothesis share of 50, and one candidate
receiving zero votes), and an upper bound close to 100 (many candi-
dates, each with a tiny null-hypothesis share, and one candidate re-
ceiving every vote). As Figure 1 illustrates, though, when calculated
for all of the 1980-2010 Cook County contests, the empirical range of
the variable is nowhere near either bound. This eliminates the need
for methodological adjustments required by truncated outcome
variables.
The third assumption is necessary for measurement of effect sizes
across multiple contests. The assumption could be violated if the com-
830 [Vol. 60:821
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FIGURE 1. OUTCOME VARIABLE, ALL CANDIDATES 1980-2010
100
m 75
50
0
Z 25-
0_
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Vote percentage minus null hypothesis percentage
position of the electorate differed across contests, either on the same
ballot or in different election years, or if any of the explanatory vari-
ables changed in importance over time. In this regard there is good
news and bad news. The good news is that for contests appearing on
the same Cook County ballot, vote totals are usually consistent to
within a few percentage points, indicating that the same group of vot-
ers votes on each contest and that large numbers of voters do not
jump in and out from one contest to the next. The bad news is that
voter turnout in Cook County and the number of votes on judicial
contests have varied considerably in different election years. Moreo-
ver, there is no basis for assuming perfect stability among the explana-
tory variables over time, and there are many possible reasons why a
given variable could vary in importance from one election year to an-
other. Performing a separate analysis for each election year would
sidestep these issues; however, the data sets for some individual elec-
tion years are too small to adequately test all of the explanatory vari-
ables. Consequently, some degree of imprecision in the effect-size
estimates may be an unavoidable tradeoff to allow for an adequately
large data set.
How do the three assumptions translate into a working model? Ta-
ble 5 provides an example. It presents several hypothetical contests in
a jurisdiction where 8% of the electorate is pro-female and votes
strictly based on gender. The first three contests are comprised of
2011] 831
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TABLE 5. HYPOTHETICAL JUDICIAL CONTESTS WITH 8%
PRO-FEMALE VOTE
Null-
Hypothesis
Null Share of
Pro-Female Redistribution Election
Coding of
Dummy
Contest Candidate Gender Vote Pct Vote Pct to Females Result (Pct) Variable
1 A female 50 4 +4 54 +0.5
1 B male 50 4 -4 46 -0.5
2 A female 20 1.6 +6.4 26.4 +0.8
2 B male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
2 C male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
2 D male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
2 E male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
3 A female 25 2 +6 31 +0.75
3 B male 25 2 -2 23 -0.25
3 C male 25 2 -2 23 -0.25
3 D male 25 2 -2 23 -0.25
4 A female 20 1.6 +2.4 22.4 +0.3
4 B female 20 1.6 +2.4 22.4 +0.3
4 C male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
4 D male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
4 E male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
5 A female 20 1.6 +0.4 20.4 +0.05
5 B female 20 1.6 +0.4 20.4 +0.05
5 C female 20 1.6 +0.4 20.4 +0.05
5 D female 20 1.6 +0.4 20.4 +0.05
5 E male 20 1.6 -1.6 18.4 -0.2
two, four, and five candidates, respectively, with one female in each.
The null-hypothesis results in the three contests are 50%, 25%, and
20%, respectively. In each contest the pro-female votes are drawn
equally from each candidate's null-hypothesis share; the female re-
tains her pro-female votes, and the votes drawn from the males are
redistributed to the female. Note that while the redistribution is dif-
ferent in each contest, the final margin is 8% in all three.
The other two contests in Table 5 include multiple females. In the
fourth contest, two females compete against three males; in the fifth,
four females compete against one male. In the fourth contest, the
redistributed votes are split between the two females; as a result, each
gains a 4% advantage over the males. Similarly, in the fifth contest,
the redistribution gives each of the four females a 2% advantage over
the lone male.
Most of the explanatory variables in the model are dichotomous
(male/female or endorsed/not endorsed, for example) and can be rep-
resented by simple dummy variables. But instead of the typical
832
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one-zero dummy variable coding, the variables will be coded using
positive and negative fractions. The fractions will offset within each
contest and sum to zero, representing a pure redistribution of votes.
For instance, in the second contest of Table 5, each of the five candi-
dates stands to lose an equal one-fifth share of the pro-female vote.
The four male candidates lose their shares; the female retains her
share and gains the males' shares. The coding for gender is thus -0.2
for each male and +0.8 for the female. In other contests with different
mixes of males and females, different positive and negative codes will
represent the same effect size with different redistributions.
To state the model more formally, it will take the standard OLS
regression form:
Y = a + bX; + b 2X 2 +. . .b,X,, + e.
For each contest i, and each candidate j within contest i, the out-
come variable is calculated as
Y# = vi - (100% / ce),
where v;; is the candidate's actual vote percentage, ci is the number of
candidates in contest i, and (100% / c;) is the null-hypothesis vote per-
centage for each candidate.
With the exception of campaign spending (see below), the attributes
represented by the explanatory variables will be coded as described
above, based on the presence or absence of the attribute for each can-
didate and on the number of candidates in each contest who possess
the attribute. Candidates who do not possess the attribute are coded
with the negative fraction -1 / ci. This represents the loss of a propor-
tionate share of votes related to the attribute. Candidates who pos-
sess the attribute are coded with the following positive fraction:
1
* c
Ci
Cih
In the above fraction, cig represents the number of candidates in con-
test i who do not possess the attribute, and cih represents the number
of candidates who do possess it. The numerator is the total vote lost
by all candidates in contest i who do not possess the attribute; the
denominator divides that total vote to distribute it equally among the
candidates who possess the attribute. The expression can be further
simplified: Cjg - (c - C ih - c, c 1 1
CiCih CiCih CiCth Ci ih Cth Ci
One major advantage of this model is that the analysis can be per-
formed using OLS regression, which allows for estimates of the inde-
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pendent effect size of each explanatory variable. However, a special
adjustment is required to do so. In OLS regression the t, F, and ad-
justed-r2 statistics are calculated based on (n - k - 1) degrees of free-
dom, where n is the size of the data set and k is the number of
explanatory variables. The n units are assumed to be independent.
As explained above, though, candidates in contested elections are not
independent. In each contest with c candidates, the vote total for the
cth candidate is fixed based on the vote totals of the other c - 1 candi-
dates. In other words, for each contest there is one less independent
unit than the number of candidates. Therefore, with multiple contests
in a single data set, the (n - k - 1) figure must be further reduced by
the number of contests in the data set to arrive at the true number of
degrees of freedom. Standard-error calculations for the regression co-
efficients must be modified in this manner; otherwise the resulting t
statistics would be incorrectly high and would overstate the signifi-
cance levels of the coefficients. Similarly, without modifying the F
and adjusted-r- calculations, the values of those two statistics would be
incorrectly high and would be too generous in evaluating the fit of the
full model.
VI. VARIABLES AND DATA
All of the variables in the four categories discussed above will be
included in the analysis. All are concrete, straightforward, and can be
operationalized without difficulty. Slated candidates, for instance, are
coded positively, and unslated candidates are coded negatively. For
subcircuit contests in which different parts of the subcircuit endorsed
different candidates, the positive coding for the endorsed candidates is
adjusted proportionally, based on the number of votes cast in each
portion of the subcircuit. Slating information was gathered from a
wide variety of sources including party literature, candidate websites,
archives of newspaper articles and advertisements, and in some sub-
circuit contests directly from local political leaders or from candidates
themselves.
Newspaper archives also provided data on bar and newspaper rec-
ommendations. Separate variables were formulated for each of the
four major sources of recommendations. For the Tribune and Sun-
Times endorsements, the endorsed candidates are coded positively
and the unendorsed candidates coded negatively. There is one qualifi-
cation: between 1996 and 2004 the Sun-Times did not issue its own
endorsements but instead printed detailed grid charts of ratings from
many different bar groups. Candidates with the best collective ratings
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in the charts are coded as receiving the Sun-Times endorsements in
those years.
Bar ratings are generally three-tiered: highly qualified, qualified, or
not qualified. The candidate or candidates who earned the highest
rating in each contest are coded positively; the others are coded nega-
tively. In contests in which every candidate received the same rating,
all of the candidates are coded with zeroes, representing no advantage
or disadvantage. Ultimately, because of high correlations among
these four variables, the variables were combined into a single four-
point scale variable. In combining the four, each was weighted based
on its relative effect size in Cook County retention elections: Tribune
1.4, Sun-Times 0.8, CBA 1.1, and CCL 0.7.15 This weighting assumes
that as in retention voting, some of the information sources are more
widely used than others in primary voting.
Also straightforward is the coding for the ballot-cue variables. Fe-
male candidates are coded positively and males negatively. Candi-
dates listed first on the ballot are coded positively; the remaining
candidates negatively. For Irish names, one variation in coding was
added. Candidates with Irish middle or maiden names, or candidates
whose surnames have multiple ancestries that include Irish, are coded
as half-positives. The "Irishness" of names was determined by re-
search on genealogical websites. 16
Finally, campaign spending is unlike any of the other variables and
must be coded differently. While it will be treated as a redistributive,
zero-sum variable like the others, it cannot be assumed to have the
same influence in every contest because spending patterns differ from
one contest to another. In some contests there are substantial spend-
ing disparities among candidates, while in others the candidates spend
more equally. Contests with greater disparities in spending will be
expected to see a greater redistribution of votes than contests in which
spending is more uniform. Note that the spending disparity in a con-
test is not the same as the total spending in a contest. Total spending
is not a factor in this redistributive model because if all candidates in a
contest spend equally, whether the amount is high or low, no candi-
date will gain an advantage. What matters is the extent to which can-
didates outspend or are outspent by their opponents. This dictates the
form of the spending variable to be used: the dollar amount by which
a candidate's spending is above or below the mean spending level in
his or her contest.
15. See Klumpp, Retention Elections, supra note 2, at 105.
16. See HOUSE OF NAMES, http://www.houseofnames.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2011); IRISH
SURNAMES, http://www.irishsurnames.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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Campaign spending totals were obtained from the Illinois State
Board of Elections (ISBE) Web site for recent election years and
through an extensive review of ISBE microfiche records for earlier
years.' 7 The totals are based on the expenditure amounts reported by
the candidates for the July 1-June 30 period encompassing their pri-
mary contests. All amounts were adjusted to include in-kind contribu-
tions and to exclude loan repayments and non-campaign items
classified as expenditures under ISBE requirements. Following these
adjustments, the net amounts were adjusted for inflation to standard-
ize them across the different election years.
In addition to adjusting the net amounts for inflation, one further
adjustment to the spending data is necessary. Countywide Demo-
cratic candidates who are slated by the county's party organization are
expected to contribute an assessed amount as their share of the organ-
ization's campaign expenses. These assessments have ranged from
$5,000 in the early 1980s to $25,000 in 2008 and 2010. Because the
amounts are part of the slating process and not part of a candidate's
individual campaign activity, they must be subtracted from the candi-
dates' reported spending totals. Otherwise they will in effect be
double-counted and multicollinearity will result.
Once all of the variables were coded, the candidates were grouped
into three data sets for analysis. Given the fundamental differences
between countywide and subcircuit contests, a combined analysis
would be improper, so separate data sets were assembled for county-
wide Democratic contests, subcircuit Democratic contests, and subcir-
cuit Republican contests. Countywide Republican contests were too
few in number and too chronologically dispersed to allow for a suffi-
cient data set.
VII. RESULTS: COUNTYWIDE CONTESTS
The final countywide data set consists of 684 candidates who com-
peted in 146 Democratic contests for circuit court and appellate court
vacancies between 1986 and 2010. The supreme court category and
the 1980, 1982, and 1984 election years were omitted due to insuffi-
ciently small numbers of contests. Also omitted were six contests in-
volving well known local political names because they were
overwhelmingly decided on the basis of name recognition.
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis on the county-
wide data set. The results strongly confirm that all six of the explana-
17. See ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECrIONS, http://www.elections.state.il.us/Campaign
Disclosure/CandidateSearch.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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tory variables convey advantages in the countywide contests. They
also reveal the relative importance of each variable. Party slating, a
10.4% advantage, is a valuable asset but not an overwhelmingly pow-
erful one. The female and Irish name cues, advantages of 14.7% and
10.5% respectively, are particularly noteworthy. A single candidate
who can monopolize either or both of these advantages in a contest
can more than overcome the disadvantage of not being slated.
TABLE 6. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES ON COUNTYWIDE
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS
All data
1986-2010 1986-1992 1994-2000 2002-2010
Female 14.67 *** 13.67 *** 16.86 *** 11.86 ***
Irish 10.49 *** 10.59 *** 9.11 *** 9.69 *
First ballot position 4.54 * 2.65 * 3.73 *** 7.97 ***
Newspaper/bar rating (per 1 of 4) 2.58 *** 2.84 *** 1.63 *** 3.42 ***
Party slating/endorsement 10.41 *** 7.54 ** 13.41 *** 9.02 ***
Spending advantage (per $1Ok) 0.24 *** 0.61 * 0.17 0.20
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 684 213 329 142
Number of contests 146 51 57 38
r
2(adj) .66 .64 .68 .71
F 175.8 *** 48.6 *** 95.6 *** 43.3 ***
* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001
The combined impact of the newspapers and bar groups is 10.3%.
That is, a candidate who receives the endorsements of both newspa-
pers and the highest rating in his or her contest from both bar groups
gains a 10.3% advantage. Of course, the four sources do not always
agree on a single candidate, and in many instances two or more candi-
dates in a contest receive the highest bar rating, so the 10.3% is often
divided among multiple candidates.
Ballot position also proves advantageous, providing a boost of more
than 4.5% to the candidate listed first in each contest. Finally, cam-
paign spending proves to be of little value. The coefficient of 0.24 per
$10,000 of spending advantage means that a candidate who outspends
his or her opponents by $50,000 will gain only 1.2% of the vote.
Overall the model accounts for nearly two-thirds of the variability
in the outcome variable, despite the span of the data set across thir-
teen elections with widely varying voter turnout. Examination of the
residuals reveals that the remaining variability is not substantially cor-
related with election year, as was speculated; instead, much of it ap-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
pears to be linked to other name characteristics besides gender and
Irish ethnicity. In particular, the larger outliers indicate that voters
have at times reacted unfavorably to certain other ethnicities (al-
though the data set is not diverse enough to be able to generalize
about specific ethnicities). Also, some Irish surnames fare better than
others with voters. Contests with surnames that are Irish but less
common tended to produce larger residuals, suggesting that the cod-
ing scheme of Irish/half-Irish/not Irish is a bit of an oversimplification.
Election-year variability cannot be entirely dismissed, though.
Quite the contrary-single-year regressions were run for each of the
thirteen election years, and while most were too limited by small data
sets to be entirely useful, several revealed instances in which individ-
ual variables were affected by election-specific external factors. For
example, in the 2008 primary, when locally born and raised Hillary
Clinton was competing for the Democratic presidential nomination
and voter turnout was extremely high, the advantage for female judi-
cial candidates was more than 20%. But in the very next primary,
which saw much lower turnout and a widely reported mood of discon-
tent among the electorate-strongly reminiscent of the "angry white
male" electorate of 199418-the female advantage plummeted to 5%.
Both results are highly statistically significant and are corroborated by
the results of subcircuit contests (strong showings by female candi-
dates in 2008 but little apparent advantage in 2010). These are the
most extreme examples, but other evidence scattered throughout the
thirteen elections also supports the notion that the idiosyncrasies of
both the electorate and the top-of-ballot contests in each individual
election can affect the results of judicial contests.
Is there evidence of a more gradual change over time in any of the
explanatory variables? To find out, the data set was divided into three
subsets of sufficient size for analysis: 1986-1992, 1994-2000, and
2002-2010. Table 6 above reports the regression results for the three
subsets. While small differences among the regressions would be ex-
pected due to random chance, several results appear worthy of atten-
tion: an apparent rise and fall in the values of gender and slating; an
opposite movement in recommendation use; an increase in the value
of ballot position; and a decrease in the effectiveness of campaign
spending. Some of these results are more easily explained than others
(see Part IX).
18. David Paul Kuhn, Op-Ed., Revenge of the White Men, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A17.
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VIII. RESULTS: SUBCIRCUIT CONTESTS
The subcircuits offer a valuable opportunity for comparisons, not
only between subcircuit contests and countywide contests, but also
among contests in different subcircuits with electorates of varying eth-
nic and socioeconomic characteristics. The one impediment to per-
forming these comparisons is that because the subcircuit system is less
than twenty years old, the number of contests held in each subcir-
cuit-an average of only thirteen-is not yet large enough to fully an-
alyze individual subcircuits. Fortunately, with some judicious
grouping of similar subcircuits, several useful sets of results were gen-
erated. The top half of Table 7 below presents the regression results
for three subcircuit groups.
Subcircuits 9, 10, and 11 (the 9-10-11 group) cover the near-north-
ern suburbs, along with some near-western suburbs and the far north
and northwest sides of Chicago. Included in the subcircuit are many
of the county's highest-income and best-educated communities. Sev-
eral of the regression results for this group are noticeably different
from those of the countywide contests. The name-cue advantages are
less valuable, and oddly enough there is no detectable ballot-position
advantage. Also, campaign spending is much more effective than in
the countywide contests. A candidate who can outspend his or her
opponents by $50,000 can gain a 7.1% advantage in votes.
Subcircuits 4, 12, 13, and 15 cover the outer-ring suburbs. Most of
the contests in these four subcircuits have been Republican; although
the last few elections have seen an increase in Democratic contests,
the data set at present is sufficient for analysis only on the Republican
side. The regression results for the Republican contests show that
campaign spending pays off at similar rates as in the 9-10-11 group
Democratic contests. Slating, however, is much more valuable, and
first ballot position does convey an advantage. In addition, the advan-
tage for female candidates is smaller than in the countywide contests,
but is roughly equal to that of the 9-10-11 group.
Subcircuits 1, 2, 5, and 7 are black-majority subcircuits covering the
west and south sides of Chicago, along with some near-southern sub-
urbs. They include many of the county's lowest-income and least-edu-
cated communities. For this group, the analysis was modified after the
initial results showed a poor model fit, and the initial residuals showed
a strong voter preference for names most likely to be names of Afri-
can-American candidates. Using a U.S. Census-derived list of the 500
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TABLE 7. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES
ON SUBCIRCUIT CONTESTS
Female
Irish
African-American
First ballot position
Newspaper/bar rating (per I of 4)
Party slating/endorsement
Spending advantage (per $ 10k)
Constant
n
Number of contests
r2(adj)
F
Female
Irish
First ballot position
Newspaper/bar rating (per I of 4)
Party slating/endorsement
Spending advantage (per $ 10k)
Constant
n
Number of contests
r 2(adj)
F
* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001
Note: One 9th Subcircuit contest was omitted due to name recognition.
most common African-American surnames, 19 a new name-cue varia-
ble was coded in the same manner as the Irish variable and was substi-
tuted into the regression for the Irish variable (which was statistically
19. Most Common Last Names, MONGABAY.COM, http://names.mongabay.com/data/
black.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
840
Democrat
9,10,11
9.85 ***
8.13 *
1.25
3.03 ***
9.05 ***
1.42 ***
0.00
181
37
.64
44.2 *
Republican
4, 12, 13, 15
10.43 ***
10.59 ***
4.43 **
2.80 *
14.48 ***
1.49 ***
0.00
156
49
.70
41.8 ***
Democrat
3
7.56
13.74 *
5.98
4.30 **
22.82 ***
0.91
0.00
47
13
.79
21.1 *
Democrat
1, 2, 5, 7
11.29 ***
24.79 ***
3.82 *
1.29 *
14.78 ***
1.91 ***
0.00
162
45
.62
32.9 ***
Democrat
city (1986-92)
14.63**
8.44 **
6.18 **
2.59 **
10.46 ***
1.39 *
0.00
87
21
.66
22.6 **
Democrat
8
17.10 ***
6.93 **
4.30 **
3.11 ***
13.47 ***
0.37 *
0.00
71
14
.78
34.8 ***
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insignificant). The modified results, reported in Table 7, dramatically
show that the four subcircuits give strong support to candidates with
African-American surnames. Campaign spending proves productive
once again, at a rate even slightly higher than in the suburbs, and slat-
ing is worth a substantial 14.8%. Slating in many of these contests has
tended to be less unified and more community-based than in other
subcircuits, but as the results show, even a local endorsement in part
of a subcircuit can pay off. One other important result is the low us-
age of newspaper and bar recommendations. The result of 1.3% per
source, or 5.6% total, is statistically significant but noticeably lower
than in the rest of the county.
The bottom half of Table 7 reports results from analyses of three
small sets of contests. None of the sets is large enough for a satisfac-
tory analysis of all variables, but each produces at least one meaning-
ful result. Subcircuit 8, for instance, borders the Chicago lakefront
from just south of the Chicago Loop northwards to near the city lim-
its. It includes the so-called lakefront liberal city wards and is argua-
bly the most liberal of the fifteen subcircuits. Regression results for
the subcircuit show a 17% advantage for female candidates-the
county's largest gender advantage.
Subcircuit 3 consists mainly of the far southwest side of Chicago.
One of the subcircuit's distinguishing characteristics is the presence of
strong local political organizations; another is a substantial population
of Irish ancestry. Table 7 shows just how strong the political organiza-
tions can be, providing more votes for a subcircuit-wide endorsement
than anywhere else in the county. Likewise, the 13.7% advantage for
the Irish name cue is also the county's highest, although not as high as
might be expected (possibly because of the small data set; note the
significance level of only .05).
The final set of results in Table 7 is not from the current subcircuit
system, but rather from the city-only contests that were discontinued
after the subcircuit system was implemented. It is included here for
comparison to the analysis of countywide contests for the same
1986-1992 time period, reported previously in Table 6. The most sig-
nificant difference is the stronger influence of slating in the city than
in the suburbs, which comes as no surprise. At 10.5% in the city con-
tests and 7.5% in countywide contests, the suburban figure is obvi-
ously well below 7.5%. Also of greater value in the city contests is
first ballot position. Finally, as with the subcircuits, campaign spend-
ing has a much more substantial impact in the city contests than in the
countywide contests.
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There is one important point not reflected in Table 7. Although it
cannot yet be proven statistically, scattered evidence strongly suggests
that surname advantages in subcircuit contests are not limited to the
black and Irish subcircuits. Candidates with Hispanic, Polish, and
Jewish names all appear to gain significant advantages in subcircuits
with matching ethnic populations. Measuring the sizes of these advan-
tages will require more contests in future elections to build up the
data sets for those subcircuits.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. Name Cues
Democratic Party leaders in Cook County are known to be wary of
the effects of female and Irish names in judicial primaries. In fact, the
party has been known to recruit ringers-individuals with female
names, Irish names, or both, who promise to engage in no campaign
activity whatsoever-and strategically place them in countywide con-
tests where a slated candidate is at a name-cue disadvantage. The re-
sults of this study demonstrate that the party has good reason to be
wary. A single Irish-named female candidate in a countywide contest
will attract enough votes to overwhelm the advantage of party slating,
and in addition can offset all of the potential advantage of bar and
newspaper recommendations. Consequently, the number of female
and Irish-named candidates in the contest plays a pivotal role in deter-
mining the victor.
The name-cue advantages are not constants, though. As discussed
above, the size of the gender advantage is dependent on the type of
electorate that turns out and votes in a given election. It also has
shown longer-term variability. Female candidates for judgeships and
other offices saw a surge in voter support in the aftermath of the con-
troversial Clarence Thomas Supreme Court hearings of 1991.20 The
results in Table 6 suggest that this support endured for several elec-
tions, but as more women have won elective offices and the political
gender gap has gradually narrowed, the pro-female vote has lessened
somewhat. The surname advantages can also vary, but the variation
found in this study is geographical rather than temporal. A surname
that proves to be a powerful asset among one electorate can be of no
value in another and might even be a liability.
20. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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B. Party Slating
Slating, like gender, has fluctuated in value over time. Judicial elec-
tions in the mid- and late 1980s took place in the shadow of Operation
Greylord, the long-running investigation of judicial corruption in
Cook County that was first revealed to the public in August of 1983.
Greylord clearly caused voters to distrust the county Democratic
Party's selection of judicial candidates, so much so that in the 1984
primary, voters actually rejected the entire party slate in the six con-
tests on the ballot. Table 6 suggests that this distrust endured to a
lesser extent for several more elections, until Greylord eventually dis-
appeared from the headlines. And while slating did return to a histor-
ically higher level, in more recent elections it appears to have lost
value again. With the heyday of the county's Democratic machine
long since passed, and with voters increasingly reluctant in recent
years to align themselves with any political party at all, some loss of
slating value seems inevitable. Nevertheless, as shown by the subcir-
cuit regressions, local political organizations are still capable of deliv-
ering substantial numbers of votes to slated candidates, both
Democratic and Republican.
C. Ballot Position
Some of the more puzzling results to emerge from the regressions
were produced by the ballot position variable. For instance, why does
the first-position advantage disappear in the 9-10-11 group? It might
simply be a statistical anomaly, but there is a more substantive expla-
nation. Among the ballot position studies cited above are isolated
findings that the first position is less influential in areas where voters
are better informed politically21 and among older voters and in areas
where fluency in English is highest. 22 The 9-10-11 group fits all of
those characteristics; its suburban townships and city wards have some
of the highest educational levels in the county as well as the highest
median ages. This is probably not a coincidence.
Harder to explain is the apparent increase in the first-position ad-
vantage over time, and especially the measurement of an eight-point
advantage in the 2002-2010 period. It might be tempting to see this
increase as evidence of voters gradually becoming less politically in-
formed and more susceptible to ballot cues. However, the female and
Irish name cues do not show the same consistent increase. Why one
cue and not the others? Another possibility is that the increase is
21. Miller & Krosnick, supra note 5, at 316.
22. King & Leigh, supra note 5, at 85.
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somehow connected to the new voting equipment introduced in Cook
County in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. Ballot de-
sign and ballot configuration can have substantial effects on judicial
elections, 23 so there might be some unrecognized causal influence that
amplifies the first-position advantage in the newer optical-scan and
touch-screen voting systems. For now this is only speculation; the
question will have to remain unanswered until more time passes and
more contests become available for analysis.
D. Newspaper and Bar Association Recommendations
The aftermath of every primary election in Cook County produces
predictable grumbling about the failure of the electorate to follow
newspaper and bar association recommendations in judicial contests.
The results in Tables 6 and 7 show that while recommendation use is
far from insignificant, it can be negated by slating and overwhelmed
by ballot cues. Can the situation be changed? Clues provided by
several of the regression results suggest that the impact of recommen-
dations can be increased.
The chronological analysis presented in Table 6, and an examination
of the single-year regressions discussed above, reveals a decrease of
roughly 40% in recommendation use that coincides with the absence
of Chicago Sun-Times endorsements of judicial candidates beginning
in 1996. The detailed grid charts of bar association ratings that the
Sun-Times printed between 1996 and 2004 in place of its own one-
name-per-contest endorsements appear to have been largely or en-
tirely disregarded by the newspaper's readership. The resumption of
Sun- Times endorsements in 2006 coincides with a rebound in total
recommendation use to the pre-1996 level and even slightly above.
This mirrors an important finding of research on judicial retention
elections: simpler information is better. Complicated forms of voter
information are not well-received by the electorate, to put it mildly;
only the simplest, clearest recommendations have any hope of being
retained and acted upon by voters who are much more focused on
top-of-ballot contests. 24
The biggest single surprise in any of the jurisdictions or time periods
analyzed in this study is the 12.1% total recommendation use in the 9-
10-11 group. Why is that number not substantially higher? In Cook
County retention elections, recommendation use is highly correlated
23. See Klumpp, Retention Elections, supra note 2, at 236-37.
24. Accord id. at 234.
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with educational level.2 5 Here, though, the 12.1% level in the highly
educated 9-10-11 group is only slightly higher than the 10.3% level in
the countywide contests. Assuming that it is not a statistical anomaly,
this finding is a mystery. One possible explanation may involve the
subcircuit boundaries. Some of the subcircuits are highly gerry-
mandered, including 10 and 11 and the western half of 9. In addition,
the subcircuit boundaries are unrelated to those of any other state or
county governmental unit. It may be that many voters simply do not
know or remember which subcircuit they live in, and consequently do
not know which recommendations apply to their ballot. A voter sur-
vey would cast valuable light on this question. If supported by evi-
dence, a case could be made for adjusting the subcircuit boundaries to
correspond with familiar units such as wards and townships.
One other important finding, this one consistent with the correla-
tion between educational level and recommendation use in retention
voting, is the low rate of recommendation use in the 1-2-5-7 subcircuit
group. It could be that voters in those subcircuits rely on different
sources of recommendations such as community newspapers or mi-
nority bar associations, but there is no visible evidence in the election
results or regression residuals of other sources being used. These vot-
ers constitute a large and under-tapped pool that could greatly in-
crease the overall impact of recommendations. Engaging these voters
and convincing them to use recommendations would require targeted
voter outreach and education efforts by bar associations and other
civic groups.
E. Campaign Spending
It should come as no surprise that campaign spending in countywide
contests has little effect. Bottom-of-the-ballot judicial contests are of
little interest to most voters, and the sheer size of Cook County makes
it difficult for a judicial campaign to attract the attention of a mean-
ingful proportion of the electorate. It also is not surprising that spend-
ing has become less effective over time, as Table 6 indicates.
Campaigns for top-of-ballot offices have become so much more ex-
pensive and pervasive in recent years that judicial contests are being
increasingly drowned out.
The subcircuits, though, are a different story. Since each subcircuit
is only one-fifteenth as large as the county, a judicial campaign can
reach a much larger percentage of the electorate per dollar. And with
enough funding, a subcircuit campaign has a relatively better chance
25. See id. at 218-21.
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of rising far enough above the fray to attract voter attention than does
a countywide campaign. Table 7 shows that this is exactly what is hap-
pening in the subcircuits. Candidates with large campaign funds are
able to turn those dollars into significant numbers of votes.
But this raises a troubling possibility. The subcircuit system was im-
plemented based on the belief that it would increase the chances for
minorities and Republicans to be elected to the judiciary, and lessen
the influence of countywide Democratic slatemakers. Whether or not
this has actually happened, the regression results show that the system
has increased the electoral opportunities of a different group: the
wealthy. There exists at least the potential for independently wealthy
individuals to try to use subcircuit elections as their own direct route
to the judiciary, or else as a way for wealthy individuals or interest
groups to populate the court system with judges who share their politi-
cal views. And in fact, recent election cycles have seen an increase in
subcircuit candidates who spend more than $100,000 on their primary
campaigns. Whether or not this trend continues, and whether or not it
will ultimately work against the system's diversity goals, both remain
to be seen.
X. CONCLUSION
The goal of this study was to produce a viable model for analyzing
judicial primary elections. Just as this study builds upon previous ef-
forts, hopefully future studies will be performed to build upon this
one. The strengths and weaknesses of the redistributive approach
need to be better understood, and the model needs to be applied to
more and varied settings to evaluate its overall effectiveness. Never-
theless, the model has shown here that it can successfully navigate the
methodological obstacles presented by primary contests and produce
a clear and complete picture of judicial voting patterns in a large, ur-
ban jurisdiction. It also allows for side-by-side comparisons of voting
patterns in partisan and nonpartisan primaries.
The specific findings of this study regarding judicial voting in Cook
County will certainly be welcomed by those in the county who oppose
the use of partisan elections to choose judges. But it is not enough to
simply argue that the system is flawed or that contests can be decided
by variables of little or no merit. Supporters of other selection meth-
ods need to produce convincing evidence that those methods produce
a better-quality judiciary. In the absence of any such evidence, there
is simply no compelling case for abandoning partisan elections and no
persuasive argument to refute those who favor and defend the status
846 [Vol. 60:821
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quo. An electorate jaded by decades of governmental corruption will
hardly be likely to support a drastic change to its entire judicial branch
based on faith alone. So the system will remain, for better or worse.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:821848
